INTRODUCTION

The tension between the obligation to extradite and protection of the individual's civil liberties
It is accepted that challenges to deportation in the field of refugee law in the quarter century since Kioa 1 have provided a great source of energy fuelling the development of administrative law principles. In that respect they resemble the galaxies revealed by the Hubble telescope tracking the expansion of the Universe.
Although not so prolific, extradition challenges have also played a substantial role in that regard. The two fields overlap but also have their distinct features, and the High Court has been vigilant to ensure that deportations do not mask a process of disguised extradition. 2 Because of its legal complexity, aggravated by encrustations of amendments, the arcane systems of foreign law often encountered, and the often highly charged political profile of the cases, to enter the labyrinthine territory of extradition law entails the risk faced by the sojourner venturing into that country from whose dread boundaries no visitor ever returns. 3 Even then, immigration law and extradition law tend to represent opposite polarities in that challenges brought by refugees are often regarded benignly while those mounted by persons facing extradition tend to be looked down upon with suspicion and scepticism as instances of seriously dangerous or deviously corrupt criminals drawing upon secret funds to advance spurious technical objections. Although a species of criminal proceedings 4 applicants in extradition cases tend not to be accorded the benefit of the presumption of innocence.
It is a commonplace of international extradition law that it exists to facilitate cooperation between states so that perpetrators of serious crimes fleeing from one territorial jurisdiction are not immune from prosecution by claiming sanctuary in another. Rather, predominantly under bilateral treaty agreements, provision is made for the surrender of criminal fugitives to a state that seeks the return of an alleged offender. Equally, it is also accepted that extradition is a coercive administrative process that entails removing a person from his or her place of residence and subjecting them to criminal legal process in another country. Even if a person is not surrendered involvement in extradition proceedings results in substantial incursions on one's liberty, interference with one's normal life, and usually considerable expense. 5 It is not surprising then that extradition arrangements among countries address that problem by importing restrictions on the process to afford protection against arbitrary abuse and violation of the civil and political rights of a person whose extradition is sought. These two objectives, returning offenders in a proper case to answer criminal charges while nevertheless protecting accused persons against undue incursion into their personal freedoms represent two polarities that create an inherent tension in the extradition process.
The propounded theses
Part I of this article explores the extent to which the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) (the Act) arguably incorporates international human rights standards such as the fair trial standards under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) so as to restrain extradition in cases where a requested person is likely to face an unfair trial in the requesting country. It comes down affirmatively on the side of the proposition that modification of the Act to accommodate extradition exceptions included in bilateral extradition treaties between Australia and other countries is capable of importing, in a relevant case, the fair trial standards in Article 14 of the ICCPR into the evaluation of whether extradition should be refused. Further, reference to international fair trial standards arguably amounts to a relevant consideration in determining that issue. Accordingly, they provide a basis for advancing more illuminating submissions in legal argument before the courts. 6 This prompts a further question: irrespective of whether Article 14 has been given a statutory status in Australian law, to the extent that Australia is under an international obligation to observe the provisions of the ICCPR should the fact that Australia may breach that obligation if the Attorney General authorises the surrender of a person be a relevant consideration when making an extradition decision? The article concludes that it should.
As a subsidiary consequence, the recognition of the relevance of these international standards opens the way for Australian courts to more readily access, in an appropriate case, 7 the comparative jurisprudence of other human rights tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights. Further, if there is a substantive incorporation of international standards, there may be greater scope for invoking arguments based on considerations of proportionality.
Part II by way of qualification questions the capacity of Australian courts to effectively exercise judicial review in respect of an extradition decision even if the foreign trial is likely to be inconsistent with Australian and international standards of fairness. The article concludes that Unlike the Victorian legislation considered in Momcilovic having regard to international human rights standards in making surrender decisions under the Act does not require a court to make declarations that the Act is in some aspect incompatible with those standards. 7 As a matter of caution it should be observed that it will only be in specific instances that reference to such comparative human rights jurisprudence will prove illuminating and informative.
due to extreme limitations on, and practical difficulties with the judicial reviewability of the Attorney General's decision (or more usually that of the Minister to whom the function is delegated) 8 regard for 'fair trial' standards may be shielded 9 and hence rendered immune from review due to a lack of any statutory or constitutional requirement for the Attorney to disclose and justify 10 a surrender decision. In the absence of any obligation to reveal the basic reasons for such a decision a person facing extradition to a country that is unlikely to afford a fair trial will find it impossible, or at least be practically prejudiced, in attempting to advance any objection founded on that basis.
PART I: THE RELEVANCE OF FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The principle of a fair trial
It is incontestable that a fair trial is one of the fundamental elements of the common law system as developed in Australia and a central pillar of our criminal justice system. 11 This article explores the extent to which a person subject to extradition can resist extradition based on the objection that he or she is unlikely to receive a fair trial in the other country.
8
Means of including provisions in Australian extradition law protecting human rights
For Australian purposes, it has been claimed that the Act purports to resolve the tension between cooperating to extradite fugitives from justice and protecting the liberty of individuals by "striking a balance 12 between the interests of the extradition country in retrieving those whose return it seeks for violation of its laws, those of Australia in upholding its dominion over those presently on its territory, and those of the alleged extraditable persons." 13 Those underlying purposes are not, however, immediately evident from a perusal of the principal objects of the Act. Relevantly, regarding extradition from Australia, s 3 expresses the Act's objects as "to codify the law relating to the extradition of persons from Australia to extradition countries … and, in particular, to provide for proceedings by which courts may determine whether a person … is eligible to be extradited … and … to enable Australia to carry out its obligations under extradition treaties." 14 To appreciate the extent to which the Act affords protection of the human rights of a person whose extradition is sought it is necessary to have regard to:
 First, statutory objections and prohibitions against extradition directly set forth in the Act; and  Secondly, guarantees and limitations provided for in extradition treaties which are given legal effect so as to modify the operation of Part II of the Act. 15 Among the first category, s 7 of the Act explicitly provides that a person is not eligible for extradition if:  the offence for which extradition is sought is a 'political offence';  the surrender of the person is sought in order to punish the person on account of, among other reasons, the person's race, religion, nationality, or political opinion; or  they may be prejudiced at their trial by reason of such factors.
Significantly, these restrictions reflect fundamental human rights standards which are the subject of existing human rights instruments. 16 
12
Whether it is possible to perform a 'balancing' calculation objectively in exercising the discretion to refuse extradition is questioned later in this article. Regarding the notion of 'balance' see E P Aughterson, 'Australian Extradition Law', paper delivered at the Commonwealth Criminal Law Conference, Sydney, September 2008, p 1. 13 Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, 61-62: 'Extradition procedures are designed not only to ensure that criminals are returned from one country to another but also to protect the rights of those who are accused of crimes by the requesting country.' (Emphasis added.) In general concerning the protective object, see Aughterson, above note 13, p1.
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) & the Republic of Austria v Kainhofer
14 Section 3 of the Act also includes a further object of providing for "proceedings by which courts may determine whether a person is to be … extradited, without determining the guilt or innocence of the person." 15 The distinction is sometimes drawn between express statutory provisions as objections and protections under treaties as exceptions or conditions, the latter reflecting the terms of s 11 of the Act. An objection to extradition for political offences can be raised to bar extradition; see ss 5 (definition) and 7 of the Act.
Protections within the second category 17 are necessarily dependent on specific provisions made in individual extradition treaties and therefore vary according to the arrangements entered into by the parties to a particular treaty. In many cases these exceptions replicate statutory exceptions within the first category, such as the prohibition on extradition in relation to a 'political offence'. 18 However, most bilateral treaties normally go further and incorporate articles which provide, for example, that extradition shall not be granted where a person may be subjected to torture or to 'cruel, inhuman or degrading' treatment or punishment.
One such specific exception common in many recent treaties (referred to hereafter as the 'unjust' exception' and which is the subject of this analysis) is expressed as follows:
Extradition may be refused in any of the following circumstances: 
Applying protective limitations in treaties under the Extradition Act
The question arises: what is the legal effect of including a provision like the 'unjust exception' in an extradition treaty? The legislative mosaic is set forth in sub-ss 11(1) and (1A) of the Act. They relevantly provide that regulations may be made in relation to specific countries applying the Act "subject to such limitations, conditions, exceptions or qualifications as are necessary to give effect to a bilateral extradition treaty in relation to the country." The legal consequence is that where regulations are made under s 11 to give effect to a bilateral treaty, the Act applies in relation to extradition arrangements between Australia and the other country in a modified form that adapts the operation of the Act to conform to exceptions provided in the relevant treaty. 19 Hence if a treaty includes a provision like the 'unjust exception' it takes effect as a provision of the Act. Australia and the other party. In other words, it has direct legal effect as if written into the Act itself.
The immediate effect of incorporating the 'unjust exception' is therefore, at the least, to compel the Attorney or the Minister to consider when determining under s 22 of the Act whether to surrender a requested person, the personal and other circumstances of the person against the relevant criterion/criteria 20 with a view to deciding whether to refuse extradition. In that context, this article addresses a wider question:
Does engrafting the 'unjust exception' into the Act's operation directly incorporate more general international human rights standards, particularly those relating to rights to a fair trial established by the ICCPR, into Australian extradition law?
As will be discussed below, this is essentially a question of construction. 21 It entails a consideration of whether the notion of an extradition of a person being unjust, oppressive, incompatible with humanitarian considerations could include, as part of its textual content, the sense of 'unjust' etc according to the fair trial standards recognised in Article 14 of the ICCPR.
The international fair trial standards
Relevantly to this analysis, Article 14 provides:
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him … everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
20
Whether the various descriptors in the unjust exception should be treated as separate and individual tests or should be approached as a composite test is discussed below. The preferable view is that they represent an amalgam of conditions with separate meanings but which overlap and tend to work cumulatively.
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Regarding the primacy of Australian law where an international instrument has been adopted in an enactment, the correct approach is to first ascertain with precision what the Australian law is then to say how much of the international instrument Australian law requires to be implemented: It may be claimed that because of their relative specificity, the enumeration in paragraph 3 of Article 14 of fairness requirements such as the right to examine prosecution witnesses, identifies categoric situations that detract from a fair trial and thus provides more utilitarian guidance than broader statements about 'equality before the law'.
To similar effect, in relation to extradition treaties with countries that are parties to the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) Article 6 of that Convention prescribes standards governing fairness of trials that a requesting European country will be obliged to observe when making an extradition request. 23 Necessarily, the analysis of whether the 'unjust exception' imports Articles 14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR into the Act must extend beyond the mere words used in the unjust exception and have regard to the whole scope and purpose of the Act 24 and the other terms of the exception.
22
This replicates the common law principles of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit barring double jeopardy for the same offence; this objection is encapsulated in s 7(e) of the Act. It is well established that the correct approach in determining the scope of a statutory discretion that is unconfined by express statutory criteria is to ascertain the factors that may be taken into account by reference to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statutory provision (see, for
The principles regarding the incorporation of international obligations into Australian domestic law
It is now well established that lacking statutory ratification and endorsement, provisions in an international instrument do not have any immediate and direct legal effect in Australian municipal law. 25 They may, however, perform other functions such as providing guidance in the event of interpretive difficulties with the construction of an ambiguous provision in an Australian statute. They may also constitute a matter which ought properly to be taken into account in the process of executive administrative decision-making. Finally, in some instances, they may indirectly contribute to the development of common law principles where such a development might otherwise be inconsistent with an international standard or prohibition. 26 Turning to the specific instance of the ICCPR it is virtually a truism, often repeated as a judicial mantra, that it is not part of Australian domestic law. 27 That proposition may be accepted in so far as there is no Commonwealth legislation explicitly enacted for that purpose. Australia's accession to the ICCPR. The objection can be raised therefore that each represents a sui generis concept that draws no content from the ICCPR. 32 Against this, it can be said that the concepts of injustice and oppressive are facultative so are capable of gravitationally pulling into their notional compass later emerging definitions of rights (such as those in the ICCPR) that aid and inform those tests in particular factual circumstances. That is the very proposition on which this article is founded. It is predicated on the premise that the criteria in the 'unjust exception' are flexible and have no fixed meaning that would create a disconformity or inconsistency with the fair trial standards in the ICCPR.
In the first instance, of course, one must start with the way that the notions of unjust, oppressive or not compatible with humanitarian considerations have been interpreted and applied in decisions of Australian courts.
In approaching the meaning of these expressions is as well to heed the injunction of Heydon J in Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Limited v SST Consulting Pty Ltd that words like "unfair", "unjust", "oppressive" or "prejudicial" are not words of exact meaning. 33
One test or three?
The issue is complicated by a logical objection. Should the phrase "unjust, oppressive or incompatible with humanitarian considerations" be read as setting forth a composite test to be assessed cumulatively, as part of a general evaluation or may it be regarded as a test comprising three separate and disjunctive criteria to be individually assessed?
In Foster v Minister for Customs and Justice (Foster) 34 Gaudron and Hayne JJ suggest that the expression "unjust or oppressive or too severe a punishment" would be better understood as providing a single description of the relevant criterion which is to be applied rather than as three distinctly different criteria. They continued:
The use of the disjunctive "or" might suggest the need to consider each element of the expression separately but for several reasons we think it preferable not to approach the provision in that way. First, there is the fact that the terms used are, as we have already said, qualitative descriptions requiring assessment and judgment. Secondly, the use of the words "too severe" suggests a need for comparison with some standard of punishment that is regarded as correct or just or, at least, not too severe. Thirdly, the considerations which may contribute to the conclusion that something is "unjust" will overlap with those that are taken into account in considering the other two descriptions. It would, then, be artificial to treat the three ideas as rigidly distinct. Each takes its content, in part, from the use of the others. 35 construction, it seems clear that each component in the composite expression " unjust, oppressive or too severe a punishment", must be given some separate meaning. This is so even if there is a degree of overlap between them."
In New Zealand v Johnston 37 the Full Federal Court treated the concepts of 'injustice' and 'oppression' in the context of extraditions to New Zealand as forming a composite expression in which the concepts are not entirely distinct. Accordingly, each component in the composite expression should be given some separate meaning even if there is a degree of overlap between them. Building on this their Honours observed that in the composite expression 'injustice' is directed primarily to the risk of prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trial itself and oppression is directed to the hardship visited upon the accused resulting from changes in his circumstances that have occurred during the period to be taken into consideration. 38 In Honourable Brendan O'Connor v Adamas (Adamas) 39 Barker J, with whom McKerracher J agreed, commented that that, having regard to Foster, one should not take an unduly limited view to the meaning of the words "unjust" and "oppressive" and that they should have a broad connotation that would comprehend any other sufficient cause, including the passage of time since the offences are alleged to have occurred, the health of the person sought, hardship likely to arise through extradition, the likelihood of conviction, prison conditions in the requesting state, the prospects of a fair trial, the issue of natural justice and the gravity of the offence. 40 He went further and added that the concept of "humanitarian considerations" should be considered an extremely broad concept that may, depending on the circumstances of the case, go beyond the notion of a particular circumstance being "unjust" or "oppressive". 41 His Honour thereby engaged in a dual operation, attributing a broad sense to each of the words in the 'unjust exception' while accepting that those meanings could overlap, and the test overall be satisfied by factors including the prospect of a unfair trial in the requesting country that fall within one or more senses of the individual components of the composite phrase.
It is submitted that in the end there is no real contradiction between the various views expressed in these cases. Cumulatively they represent a compromise between taking a global approach to the circumstances under consideration and evaluating them according to each of the various criteria without treating the various conditions as mutually exclusive. 42 Section 34(2) does not require the Minister to take into account the nature of the offence or the interests of the requesting state. The relevant Article in the Treaty with Indonesia does contain that enlargement. Further, s 34(2) contains a mandatory prohibition while the Treaty provision is only discretionary. Against this, it may be said that the core of the test in each case is substantively the same. . Regarding the interrelationship between the meaning to be attributed to individual words in a phrase in construing and applying that phrase Gordon J identified the task as one of construing the language of the phrase as a whole in context rather than selecting the Decisions to surrender involving the 'unjust exception' should therefore be approached in a broad manner that favours a cumulative assessment of all the circumstances. However, in making that evaluation the Attorney should be guided, in a case where fair trial might be an issue, by a correct understanding of particular matters such as whether the proceedings in the requesting country would be considered unfair according to Australian and arguably international standards, and as such, fall specifically within the "unjust" criterion. Alternatively, the same standards can be applied in concluding that the requested person who may have to wait for some time before being subjected to an unfair trial in another country would be preeminently subject to "oppression". Finally, depending on the particular circumstances of the individual, including their health, the third criterion, "incompatibility with humanitarian considerations" could also come into play. 43 A resolution along the latter lines appears to be consistent with the view adopted by Barker J in Adamas, although, as he acknowledged, this is not a matter that has been authoritatively determined as yet. 44
Fairness by Australian standards
As noted above, if it is accepted that the 'unjust exception' requires the Attorney to consider whether a trial in another country would be fair the question follows: 'fair' by reference to the laws of the requesting country, international standards, or if they are different, Australian standards? 45 On the basis of current authority, it is clear that the matter is to be assessed having regard to Australian standards.
In summarising the Australian doctrine on this matter Barker J For example, to subject a person of limited intellectual capacity to complex foreign proceedings in the country recognised as not having a competent judiciary and legal profession and where legal aid is not assured could be regarded as infringing this criterion.
44
Above, note 9.
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There is some ground for concluding that the Department may consider that extradition for trial in a foreign country is sometimes preferable to domestic criminal proceedings due to more flexible fair trial standards in the requesting country. In the case of Mr Zentai, for example, in its submission to the Minister, the Department, after referring to the advice from the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions that an Australian prosecution for war crime would face difficulty in the absence of living witnesses, advised, at [119] considered "unjust, oppressive or too severe a punishment" if extradition of the requested person were to be permitted, is necessarily to be assessed by way of a value judgment, but a value judgment to be informed by reference to Australian standards. 48 This brings the analysis full circle. If Australian standards are to prevail does that also include considerations set forth in Article 14 of the ICCPR? 49 It is submitted that in an appropriate case it may. This is primarily by virtue of the incorporation of that Article under the rubric of the 'unjust exception' although it may be assumed that it informs the common law concept of a fair trial which should not be assumed to be inconsistent with it.
Instances of Australian refusal of extradition on the basis of the 'unjust exception'
An appreciation of the potential impact of Article 14 on Australian extradition decision-making may be gleaned from examining several recent decisions of the High Court and the Full Federal Court where the 'unjust exception' was raised.
In Foster, the United Kingdom requested Foster's extradition for a number of fraud charges. He argued that having spent a substantial period of time in custody in Australia where he had fled after absconding on bail in England it was unlikely that he would be sentenced to any additional term if extradited. Hence it would unjust and oppressive to do so. The Minister decided he should be surrendered nevertheless. Foster then claimed that the Minister had fallen into jurisdictional error in failing to ascertain the maximum length of sentence he could receive if extradited as it was relevant to determining what would otherwise be an oppressive surrender. The majority held that the Minister was not bound to make detailed inquiries about the likely sentence which might be imposed in concluding that she was not satisfied that it would be unjust or oppressive or too severe a punishment to surrender him. There being no obligation to make such enquiries, the Court did not have to determine whether the possibility of having to serve further time rendered the surrender unjust or oppressive according to Australian standards. 50 In Bannister, 51 New Zealand sought the extradition of a person on rape charges. Bannister had been charged in New Zealand in 1998 in relation to events alleged to have occurred many years earlier in 1975. The charges included four which were described as "representative". In each case the matters alleged were not the subject of separate detailed charges. A magistrate refused extradition under s 34(2) on the basis that Bannister would suffer considerable hardship if he were surrendered to New Zealand, having regard to the lapse of time and his personal circumstances. That decision was reversed on review by the primary judge. On appeal, the Full Court took an adverse view about the fairness of representative charges, regarding them as discredited in Australian practice and no longer allowed in this country. This reflected a ruling of the High Court that that trial on representative charges presented a risk of a miscarriage of justice. 52 As a result, the Full Court concluded that in circumstances it would be "unjust or oppressive" to return Bannister to New Zealand to answer the charges. In so doing, the Full Court held that it was permissible to have regard to the quality of the trial which the accused person would receive in New Zealand.
In Moloney, 53 New Zealand sought the extradition of a member of a religious order who were alleged to have committed various sexual offences against young boys between 1971 and 1980. The respondent claimed that it would be "unjust" to surrender him to New Zealand. It was accepted that the time that has elapsed since these offences were said to have occurred gave rise to difficulties with respect to the fairness of any trial that might take place. In proceedings before a magistrate to determine whether they were eligible for extradition they challenged their extradition on that ground that the lengthy period that had lapsed since the offences were allegedly committed meant that their surrender would be unjust. The magistrate did not uphold that objection.
On review, a single Federal Court judge reversed that finding and set aside the magistrate's orders. The judge had particular regard to the fact that, unlike New Zealand law, in an Australian trial where a person was accused of sexual offences long after they were allegedly committed the jury had to be given a special warning (known as a Longman warning) about the problem of a conviction after such a lapse of time. A Longman caution was seen to be necessary to ensure a fair trial in Australia. The Full Court extensively considered the meaning of "unjust" 54 and in turn overturned the primary judge's decision, unanimously deciding that while there were differences between Australian and New Zealand law concerning the need for a special warning that did not warrant the conclusion that it would be unjust to return the respondent to New Zealand. In particular, the Full Court concluded that despite the long period that has elapsed since the offences were allegedly committed, it would not necessarily be unjust to surrender the respondent. Whether the long delay was unfair was a matter that could be left to the New Zealand trial court to determine.
In Newman v New Zealand, 55 the appellant was an 87-year-old man whose extradition was sought in relation to charges of indecent assault of his daughters in a period spanning 1957 to 1961 and 1966 to 1975 . In the Full Federal Court he challenged a magistrate's order that he be surrendered to New Zealand, and the subsequent first instance review confirming that order, on the basis that some of the New Zealand charges made against him were "representative charges". Accordingly, it would be unjust or oppressive if he were surrendered to New Zealand. The Full Federal Court allowed the appeal on the basis that it would be possible, if he were surrendered, for him to face the charges specified in the warrant some of which were representative. In that case it would be unjust, oppressive to order his surrender at all. In New Zealand v Johnston 57 New Zealand sought the extradition of a 69 year old male Australian citizen to answer serious charges of sexual interference with a minor alleged to have occurred in the 1970s. Given the lapse of time, there were concerns that materials adduced in the original investigations and relevant testimony may no longer be accessible and capable of crossexamination.
The Full Federal Court held that the loss of such evidence did not render the respondent's surrender to New Zealand unjust. The Court first noted that allegations of sexual assault against a child are very serious matters and the nature of those allegations should weigh very heavily in favour of extradition. It also noted that in cases involving sexual misconduct towards children, delays, and hence the loss or unavailability of evidence, were very common. It could be expected, however, that any prejudice arising would be a matter that would be assessed by the New Zealand trial court. The loss of capacity to carry out necessary investigations did not constitute prejudice of such seriousness as to render the first respondent's trial in New Zealand unfair. It was not for Australian courts when determining whether surrender would be unjust to assess the strength of the prosecution case and whether the person was likely to be acquitted. The Court however distinguished that situation from a case where there was evidently some fatal flaw or where it was some reason the prosecution was clearly bound to fail. 58 It may be noted that each of the above cases entailed extradition with other Commonwealth countries, the UK and New Zealand, in which case the Extradition Act 1988 and earlier legislation has made special provision for extradition to those countries. Necessarily, because they are common law jurisdictions, Australian courts accord a great deal of respect to the fairness of criminal procedures in those countries. Not surprisingly, given the similarity and traditions of criminal process in those instances, Australian courts are well able to evaluate the issues about whether subjecting someone to trial in those countries would be unjust, oppressive, contrary to humanitarian considerations. Invocation of the international standards of fair trial in the ICCPR and the ECHR in such cases is unlikely to be particularly informative. 59 The latter standards may, however, have a more relevant application in regard to extradition requests from non-common law countries. Two recent decisions of the Full Federal Court illustrate that potential.
In Adamas 60 Indonesia requested the extradition of the respondent who had been convicted in absentia on serious fraud involving corruption and the disappearance of a great amount of funds. It may be argued on the contrary that paragraph 3(a) of Article 14 of the ICCPR, requiring that persons be informed in detail of the nature of the charges against them could provide guidance in relation to the cases dealing with representative charges above, and that paragraph 3(c) requiring the person be tried without undue delay might inform cases in which there were large time gaps between the alleged conduct and the institution of charges (although the provision seems to be primarily concerned with ensuring promptness of trial after arrest rather than lapse of time issues).
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Note 8 above.
automatic right of appeal or re-trial. Further, Indonesia had provided no evidence that he had been served with any process of a kind that would have made him aware of the charges. His leaving Indonesia would not amount to absconding if he had not been aware that he had been charged.
Barker J, with McKerracher J agreeing, found that while there was no bar on extraditing a person convicted in another country in absentia it was possible that the Minister had been misled by a Departmental submission that merely advised that it was open to him to be satisfied that surrender would not be unjust or oppressive, while failing to explain that the matter had to be evaluated according to Australian notions of fairness. 61 Nor had his attention been drawn to salient facts about the respondent's lack of awareness which could be viewed as unjust by reference to those standards. The Court held that the Minister had constructively failed to take into account relevant considerations by assuming that the Departmental submission had correctly informed him as to his decision-making task when determining whether surrender would be unjust, oppressive or incompatible with humanitarian considerations. This was because the advice he received did not properly identify the question that he should ask himself, namely; whether the in absentia conviction of the respondent in Indonesia in all the circumstances would be considered unjust by Australian standards.
In his reasons, Barker J addressed at length the respondent's submission that the Minister had failed to take into account the operation of As well, the respondent contended that the Indonesian conviction in his absence prevented him exercising his right to examine prosecution witnesses, contrary to Article 14(3)(e). This did not figure in the result.
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The essential content of legal advice in the Departmental submission were redacted from the copy of the submission made available to the respondent and the Court on the basis of legal professional privilege, the Department's claim being upheld in 74 Alternatively, he claimed, in the face of assurances that Hungary, being a party to both the ECHR and the ICCPR was bound to provide a fair trial, the Minister was under a duty to make direct enquiries of Hungary as to whether it could produce the key prosecution witnesses for examination. 75 Finally, he claimed that it would be unfair for him to be prosecuted given the great lapse of time since 1944 during which essential military documents that could substantiate his alibi that he was not in Budapest at the time had been destroyed.
At first instance, McKerracher J accepted a Commonwealth submission that in considering whether he was satisfied that surrender would not be contrary to the conditions set forth in the 'unjust exception' in the treaty, the Minister was required to make value judgements about which reasonable minds might differ. Given the comprehensive nature of the Departmental submissions presented to him it was therefore open to him to be satisfied that extradition would not be unjust, oppressive or contrary to humanitarian considerations. He also held that, particularly for reasons of international comity, the Minister was not obliged to seek further information or documentation about the way that Hungary would seek to comply with its obligations under the various international instruments if Mr Zentai was prosecuted. 76 The Full Federal Court upheld his Honour on this ground of appeal. 77 It held that, particularly given the details submissions in the Departmental submissions, the Minister could not be said to have failed to take into account a relevant consideration regarding whether Hungary, in the absence of relevant living witnesses, would be able to provide a fair trial in accordance with Article 6 of the ECHR. In any event, the Act did not require him to do so in the sense of it being an essential precondition to the valid exercise of the power arising under s 22. 78 Ironically, shortly after the Full Federal Court gave its decision in Zentai and before the High Court considered the Commonwealth's appeal on another ground, the Military Division of the Budapest Municipal Court 79 on 19 July 2011 acquitted a Hungarian citizen, Sandor Kepiro, of war crime charges alleged to have been committed in World War II while a member of the decision-makers were obliged to make enquiries about matters that could be readily ascertained and which were central to the subject matter of the decision. What is evident from a consideration of each of the two above cases is that persons challenging extradition to jurisdictions with continental criminal trial systems were able to invoke specific matters based on contravention of fair trial standards in the ICCPR in the context of deciding whether the Minister had properly understood and applied the 'unjust exception'. In neither case, however, did the Full Federal Court accept that the persons whose extradition was sought was able to establish jurisdictional error or an error of law based on the likely contravention of those international standards. In Adamas the court was able to determine the issue of whether it would be unjust to surrender the person in regard to his in absentia convictions in Indonesia solely by reference to how Australian courts would regard a prosecution in circumstances where the accused had no knowledge of the criminal proceedings against him. It is notable on the other hand that Barker J was prepared to take into account comparative international jurisprudence as not inconsistent with Australian Commonwealth standards. In Zentai also, neither McKerracher J nor the Full Federal Court went so far as to say that consideration of Article 14 of the ICCPR was irrelevant in determining injustice or oppression; rather, that Mr Zentai had not been able to demonstrate on the basis of inference that the Minister had erred.
If now directly part of Australian extradition law, does the incorporation of Article 14 form a basis for arguments invoking proportionality?
Whether proportionality is a ground of judicial review in Australian law or an adjunct of reasonableness standards, including both Wednesbury unreasonableness and jurisdictional error founded on irrationality, is a vexed question. 83 Even the relationship between the latter two (Wednesbury unreasonableness measured by absurdity of outcome, irrationality based on deficiencies or errors in the reasoning process, including not addressing a crucial and relevant 80 The testimony of a Lt Nagy was claimed to be unreliable and needing to be tested in crossexamination because it had arguably been obtained under the customary torture administered during interrogation by the pro-Russian political police. This was similar to allegations made about one of the convicted officers (remarkably also called Nagy) in Zentai.
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On the other hand there were concerns that a six year delay in prosecuting Kepiro violated his right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR.
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Barker J in Adamas note 8 above at [344] accepted that the consequences of sending an eligible person to the requesting country, including what is likely to happen once in situ, could be taken into account in assessing injustice.
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The notion of unreasonableness may also elide into jurisdictional error where a decision lacks a reasoned basis.
consideration) is still unsettled in administrative law theory. 84 Arguably the two are porous concepts that do not allow of 'bright-line' distinctions. The case law on the topic is to this point inconclusive. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li some members of the High Court appeared to contemplate that proportionality may enter the lexicon of judicial review but again backed away from a definite endorsement. 85 In this relatively fluid and plastic state it is hard to predict how these theoretical conundrums will be resolved. One possibility is development along the lines of Canadian authority, including judicial recognition of institutional integrity as an aspect of executive decision-making. 86 It is submitted that if proportionality analysis finds a place in or among the grounds of review it will be located in the field of human rights adjudication. In that event if as postulated Article 14 is now entrenched in evaluations about whether a surrender would be legally and factually unjust it may permit recourse to arguments based on proportionality in the European and international law sense. 
Conclusion regarding the relevance of the ICCPR in extradition decisions
Notwithstanding that it has not yet been authoritatively established that the international ramifications of a breach of the ICCPR is a relevant matter that the Minister is obliged to consider, it is evident from cases such as Zentai (No 3) 93 and Adamas that Australian courts have seen the international fair trial standards in the ICCPR, and attendant European jurisprudence, as informing the notions implicit in the 'unjust exception'. As such, arguably, the first part of the thesis propounded above has been sustained. This sets the scene for Part II of this article.
Given that there are sound reasons to claim that possible departures from the fair trial standards in the ICCPR and the ECHR can be invoked to judge whether surrender would be unjust, oppressive or contrary to humanitarian considerations, does it matter in the end? The better view appears to be that it does not.
PART II: ARE SURRENDER DECISIONS BASED ON NON-SATISFACTION OF THE 'UNJUST EXCEPTION' SUSCEPTIBLE OF EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW?
Even assuming that decisions relating to surrender are open to objection on the basis that surrender would entail contravention of international fair trial standards incorporated by regulation into the Act's operation, the question then is: Can the likelihood of such a contravention form the basis of successful judicial review challenging or restraining a surrender decision?
Inhibitions to effective review
Eight significant matters qualify the extent to which a court can effectively review extradition decisions of that kind. They are:
1. The principle of comity and respect for foreign judicial process in requesting countries;
2. The "double layered" nature of the extradition determination under s 22 whereby even if the Attorney is satisfied that it would be unjust to surrender a person because a fair trial in the requesting country is impossible or unlikely, the Attorney may nevertheless within the scope of a residual discretion conclude for other reasons that extradition should not be refused;
3. The coupling of the criteria in the 'unjust exception' of the need for the Attorney to take into account the nature of the extradition offence and the interests of the requesting country;
4. The virtual inviolability of the Minister's exercise of the general discretion under s 22, conceived as a "balancing" process on which minds may differ on the merits, and its effect in insulating the decision from review;
5. The effect of the "no evidence" principle and the negative object that extradition proceedings do not entail any judgments about a requested person's guilt; 93 Note 59 above.
6. The Department's resort to legal professional privilege preventing an applicant for review and the reviewing court from knowing legal advice upon which an extradition decision was based;
7. Application of the principle of non-justiciability and other discretionary reasons for not granting relief; and 8. The consequence of there being no (as yet recognised) constitutional, statutory or common law requirement to provide reasons or otherwise explain the basis of the Attorney's decision, leaving a reviewing court unable to identify how the decision was made, effectively immunising it from effective judicial review.
The first difficulty listed above (comity) represents a general restraint on the review of extradition cases. Difficulties 2 to 4 constitute structural obstacles that stand in the way of a court determining that the Minister has fallen in error on a particular matter. Difficulties 5 to 8 represent evidentiary or procedural restrictions impeding review.
Deference to foreign judicial process based on considerations of comity
It is a virtual truism of extradition law that an Australian court reviewing an extradition decision is obliged under the principle of comity not to impugn the criminal law system of a requesting country. Respect for comity requires that an Australian Minister is obliged to assume that a trial in a foreign country will be properly conducted. This is considered necessary to accommodate the fact that there are often major differences between the criminal trial process in other countries and that in Australia. Respect for the fairness of process in other common law jurisdictions such as the UK, New Zealand and Canada, as discussed above, is not surprising.
Adversarial criminal procedures such as in continental Europe (particularly in Eastern Europe) vary considerably in quality and are, accordingly, more problematic
The significance of comity in extradition law was expressed by Gordon J in Mokbel v AttorneyGeneral (Commonwealth):
The courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. This principle of non-adjudication is consistent with the international rule of comity which refers to the respect or courtesy accorded by a country to the laws and institutions of another. 94 In Mokbel her Honour was commenting in the specific context where a judicial decision of a Greek court had already been made but it is apparently presumed that the injunction to respect the decisions of foreign courts extends to include future criminal process post-extradition. This represents a considerable constraint on the extent to which Ministers and Australian courts are prepared to pass judgment on prospective investigative proceedings or trials in requesting countries. The question is, nevertheless: does comity constitute an absolute bar against questioning foreign proceedings? 95 French J made the following observation on the application of non-adjudication to extradition cases: " [I] t is important to bear in mind that the general functioning of the judicial system of an extradition country is not a matter for this court." (Emphasis added.) In dealing with the matter as one of the general functioning of a foreign judicial system his Honour appears not to have ruled out the possibility that in a particular and perhaps egregious and objectively ascertainable instance, an Australian court may reflect on the adequacy and fairness of foreign proceedings. That was certainly the effect of the decision in Adamas. 96 The conclusion can be drawn therefore that while not entirely preclusive of judicial review considerations of comity will inhibit it by ensuring that future prospective proceedings in foreign courts are likely to receive fairly low-level scrutiny calculated to avoid embarrassment. 97
By way of qualification it may be noted that in Cabal v United Mexican States (No 3)
2.
The "double layered" nature of the Attorney's function under s 22 and the possible exercise of the residual discretion to override a conclusion that surrender would be unjust in the circumstances
The structure of the discretion exercised by the Minister when considering claims based on the 'unjust exception' is governed by ss 22(3)(e) and (f) of the Act. They operate, in cases where because of s 11, the Act applies in relation to an extradition subject to a condition or qualification that has the effect that surrender of the person in relation to the offence shall or may be refused. The effect of these provisions is that first, if in such a case the Minister is satisfied that circumstances that would attract the operation of a condition or qualification mandating refusal do exist the Minister is bound not to surrender the requested person. If, secondly, the Minister is satisfied that circumstances that would attract the operation of a condition or qualification permitting but not requiring refusal exist the Minister may, in the exercise of discretion, refuse surrender. But even if the Minister is satisfied in the latter circumstances that it is open for her or him to refuse surrender on that basis the Minister may nevertheless conclude that surrender of the person in relation to the offence should not be refused.
Regarding the nature of the Minister's task when addressing a claim that surrender would be unjust or oppressive Gleeson CJ and McHugh J in Foster 98 summarised the situation as follows:
There is a double layer of satisfaction involved in s 22(3)(e) and [the regulation incorporating the 'unjust exception']. The section provides that the eligible person is only to be surrendered if the Attorney-General (or Minister) is satisfied that circumstances engaging a limitation, condition, qualification or exception to surrender contained in the Regulations do not exist. [The regulation] provides for such a limitation. It prohibits surrender if the Attorney-General (or Minister) is satisfied that it would be unjust, oppressive or too severe a punishment. Therefore, in order to surrender a person the Attorney-General (or Minister) must be satisfied that he or she is not satisfied that it would be unjust, oppressive or too severe a punishment. In Adamas, note 8 above Barker J at [427] observed that doctrines of international reciprocity cannot be relied upon to undermine the requirement to address concerns about possible injustice resulting from an in absentia conviction by reference to Australian standards under Australian law.
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Note 31 above, 200 CLR 442 at [7] . The Court was dealing with extradition to the UK where under the regulations a finding that extradition would be unjust required the Attorney to refuse.
the state of satisfaction, or lack of satisfaction, of the one decision-maker, what is critical is whether the decision-maker is satisfied of a matter referred to in [the regulation]. Applying the Act and Regulations to the present case, the Minister was obliged to ask whether she was satisfied that it would… be unjust or oppressive or too severe a punishment to surrender the eligible person. If the answer to that question were in the negative, then she would be satisfied that the circumstances referred to in s 22(3)(e)(iii) did not exist, and the qualification imposed by s 22(3)(e) upon the extent of her powers under ss 22 and 23 would not operate to inhibit their exercise. (Emphasis added)
In the result, where regulations provide that by reason of the 'unjust exception' surrender is discretionary, the Minister may come to a conclusion that in fact surrender would be unjust, oppressive or incompatible with humanitarian considerations yet still decide for reasons that may not even be disclosed to exercise the general discretion not to refuse extradition. The problem posed by the existence of this double layer is that notwithstanding a conclusion that extradition could contravene the 'unjust exception' the Attorney is free to determine that a request should not be refused if there are strong countervailing reasons to the contrary. Even a conclusion that the Minister may, in exercising the first discretion refuse extradition therefore does not mandate that he must.
3.
The coupling of the criteria in the 'unjust exception' with the need for the Attorney to take into account the nature of the extradition offence and the interests of the requesting country
The addition of these two extra criteria has the consequence that that the value judgment required in the case of treaties incorporating them is different from the alternative decisionmaking process where the 'unjust' criteria are to be considered solely by reference to themselves.
This consequence was recognised by Barker J in Adamas where he said:
What might be said … about the operation of s 22(3)(e) and Art 9(2)(b) [of the extradition treaty between Australia and Indonesia] is that the Minister at all material times was possessed of a broad function to achieve a certain level of satisfaction. He could, even if he were to consider, by reference to the circumstances of the case, that extradition of the first respondent to Indonesia would be unjust, on the basis of the first respondent's conviction in that country in absentia, nonetheless ultimately not be satisfied that it would be unjust to surrender him to Indonesia taking into account the nature of the offence and the interests of Indonesia. 99 In his view, this requires the decision-makers to balance and weigh these various factors when forming the relevant value judgement about whether extradition would be unjust. 100 In the next section whether this balancing process is susceptible to review will be examined.
4.
The virtual inviolability of the Minister's exercise of the general discretion under s 22 conceived as a "balancing" process on which minds may as a matter of the merits differ, insulating the decision from review.
A formidable and arguably intractable barrier to review is presented by the problem that the balancing process involved both in exercising their residual discretion in s 22 and the 'weighing' of an unjust surrender against the countervailing factors of the nature of the offence and the interests of the requesting country is that these divergent cluster of factors constitute a somewhat elusive and unmanageable test (in the sense of providing no clear guidelines).
The indeterminate nature of the process is reflected in a formulaic way in which the Department often couches recommendations in its submission to the Minister. These often take a form along the following lines:
"While you may give some weight to the (applicant's assertion) … it is open to you to conclude that extradition in the circumstances would not be unjust, oppressive or incompatible with humanitarian considerations." (or to similar effect): "that having regard to the nature of the offence/interests of the [requesting state] it is open to you not to refuse extradition." (Emphasis added)
How can a court determine whether the Minister has "failed to accord sufficient weight" to a particular factor? Taken to its logical limits, it would mean that in the case of extremely serious crimes involving homicide, terrorism or massive defalcations of money the nature of the offence will, as a matter of proportion, virtually outweigh any other mitigating circumstance. Commit an offence against the US Patriot Act and off you go, even if you will be tried before a military commission in Guantanamo Bay (assuming it is still open)! 101 The seriousness of the offence could virtually become the sole and exclusive consideration. Even more elusively the ambiguous character of "interests of a requesting state" comes close to Australia (and arguably the court) having to make political judgments about foreign regimes. This is compounded by the initial problem that in an extradition challenge the applicant must be able to establish that the Minister had regard to one of other of these factors. In the absence of a clear evidentiary basis for so concluding, any decision resulting from the balancing process is virtually immune from review.
That may be an acceptable outcome so far as it insulates courts from engaging, impermissibly, in a political assessment on the merits entailed in the balancing process itself 102 but arguably goes too far where that process has been contaminated by substantial errors of law and misunderstandings that go to the heart of the process. The need for a means of identifying aberrations of the latter kind in the absence of reasons remains for consideration below.
The inhibiting effect of the "no evidence" principle and the negative object that extradition proceedings do not entail any judgments about a requested person's guilt
While not in terms precluding production of relevant material evidence, the "no evidence" rule arguably tends to create a context of expeditious extradition that tips the scale against a court scrutinising evidentiary material too closely lest the court infringes the injunction against not 101 The matter is not quite that simple. In the case of US extradition requests, for constitutional reasons ironically, the decision is subject to a prima facie case test.
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Courts have long recognised the inappropriateness of judicial resolution of complaints about the reasonableness of governmental conduct where such complaints are political in nature and require curial judgments about the reasonableness of governmental action. Decisions about the latter involve competing public interests in the absence of any criterion by which a court can assess where the balance lies between the weight to be given to one interest and that to another; This objection is based on the premise that in the absence of a statement of the Minister's reasons there can be no direct evidence of the basis on which the Minister did not disallow extradition. Given that the Minister in her or his discretion may decline to refuse extradition notwithstanding that extradition would be unjust, oppressive or incompatible with humanitarian considerations this opens the possibility that the Minister may have had regard to other possible reasons which may remain undisclosed. In those circumstances it is appropriate to ask: to what extent can a court draw inferences from the Departmental submission to identify the underlying considerations and reasons on which the extradition decision was based? This requires an appreciation of the function of Departmental submissions as part of the decisionmaking process.
In extradition cases the main document before the reviewing court will be the Departmental submission to the Minister setting out the facts, law, applicants' submissions, the Department's comments and legal advice, and recommendations of the Department regarding the same. Invariably in those cases that are reported, the Department recommends that the Minister should not refuse extradition. This is accompanied by a box giving the Minister three options: "approved", "not approved" and "discuss ". Given that the Minister normally does not provide any statement of his or her reasons the question arises: What inferences, if any, can be drawn from the contents of the Departmental submission concerning the basis of the Minister's decision?
Case law clearly establishes that the submission prepared by the Department does not constitute a statement of, or substitute for, the Minister's reasons: in particular, it cannot be taken to indicate the Minister's decision-making process. 104 This is particularly so where material in the submission has been redacted. This does not preclude, however, the drawing of inferences from statements or omissions in the Departmental submission 105 although there are numerous judicial comments indicating that a court should be cautious and slow to draw any adverse inference about the Minister's reasons.
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Arguably, the trend towards streamlining the extradition process has been at the expense of individual rights. A Court should accept that where, for example, the Departmental submission is fulsome and detailed inferences should not be made concerning whether the Minister fairly turned his mind to the material before him. 106 The assumption is that the Minister has read the same in their entirety together with any submissions made by the applicant. 107 Different considerations may apply where the court is able to deduce from the material put before the Minister that on a specific matter the Minister was erroneously or inadequately advised on a matter of law, including its application to the particular circumstances.
Thus in Adamas, Barker J, for the majority, found that absence of reasons did not necessarily preclude review regarding whether the Minister was adequately advised about the requirement that potential injustice should be assessed by reference to Australian standards. 108 In his view, having regard to the principles of good public administration it is not only open to a judge to draw an inference about whether the Minister took into account a relevant consideration or could have been misled by the Departmental submission; it may also be reasonable in all of circumstances to conclude that the Minister had done so. Thus, if it can be demonstrated that any particular guidance provided in the Departmental submission "was relevant and apparently significant to the recommendation made, but wrong, or a relevant matter was not addressed, then plainly there would be a case for considering that the exercise of the Minister's power miscarried by reason of jurisdictional error." 109
The majority of the Full Federal Court held that the deficiency in the advice to the Minister amounted to a jurisdictional error, particularly since it failed to advert to how as a matter of fairness it would be viewed in an Australian context if a person not aware of charges against him or her was convicted in absentia. 110 That conclusion was summarised by Barker J as follows:
In the event, the Minister was not unequivocally advised that in the course of forming a value judgment as to whether the first respondent's extradition to Indonesia would be unjust he may regard the various factors listed in Art 9(2)(b), but that when considering the in absentia conviction circumstance he needed to ask if it would be considered unjust by Australian standards. … What is clear … however, is that the failure to address these factors clearly in The approach of the Full Court's majority in Adamas must be taken with a qualification, namely that it may be subject to further scrutiny if the High Court gives the Commonwealth special leave to appeal the decision.
6.
The resort to legal professional privilege preventing an applicant for review and the reviewing court from knowing the content of legal advice upon which an extradition decision was based
The fact that the reviewing court has limited scope to infer the Minister's process of reasoning from the Departmental submission is aggravated by the practice whereby the Department usually provides a copy of its submission to a person seeking to challenge in redacted form. Legal advice given to the Minister is therefore excluded from scrutiny by both the challenger and a reviewing court. In Zentai v Honourable Brendan O'Connor (No 2) 113 McKerracher J held that references to conclusions made in legal advice given by Australian prosecuting authorities and provided to the Minister by the Department sufficiently indicated the nature of that advice to amount to a waiver of legal professional privilege. The full text of the various advices was then provided to the applicant in unredacted form. 114 In Adamas v Honourable Brendan O'Connor (first instance), 115 however, the primary judge had regard to the comprehensive reductions in the Departmental submission and distinguished Zentai as turning on its own facts. He held that there was no basis for finding that legal professional privilege had been waived.
In future cases it may be assumed that care will be taken in redacting the submission to ensure that privilege is not waived. The resort to legal professional privilege will probably continue to be a substantial obstacle to applications for review shielding the reviewing court from knowing and judging the soundness of any legal advice upon which an extradition decision is based. Even then, in the case of Zentai when possible erroneous legal advice was disclosed it could not be found to support of finding a jurisdictional error for the reasons discussed in note 112.
Principle of non-justiciability and exercise of discretion not to grant relief
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[2011] FCA 948.
While it is not a doctrinal bar, considerations of justiciability 116 often work to preclude certain politically contentious administrative decisions from review. In other common law jurisdictions, such as England and Canada, issues of justiciability and deference are often mingled, both operating to create zones of executive non-accountability. 117 They have been criticised as doctrines of abstention, 118 allowing an abdication of the judicial responsibility to protect legal rights. 119 Avoidance of issues as non-justiciable is compounded by the fact that even if prepared to enter upon consideration of a matter 120 a court can, in the exercise of discretion, decline to grant any relief. 121 So far, in Australia the High Court has set its face against allowing deference to institutional expertise to emerge as a factor for not intervening to review some decisions. 122 Justiciability and its correlative standing to sue on the other hand can still pose problems where issues such as national security, global economic crises, or international relations are concerned. 123 
116
Extradition proceedings can entail each of the latter. Allied with claims of comity these factors can represent significant barriers to judicial intervention in surrender decisions.
8.
The consequence of there being no statutory or common law requirement to provide reasons, or otherwise explain the basis of the Attorney's decision leaving a reviewing court unable to identify how the decision was made, thereby effectively immunising the decision from effective judicial review Each of the above difficulties entailing procedural and evidentiary limitations confronts an applicant who seeks review of an extradition decision. They substantially diminish the capacity of a court to exercise judicial review effectively. Where the matter is one where the Minister might have exercised his or her general discretion it is particularly difficult to mount a challenge solely by reference to the objects and purposes of the Act authorising the exercise of power. 124 Even where resort to inference is permissible it largely is deficient in the absence of a requirement for the Minister to particularise the basis for his or her decision. For the most part their reasoning process will remain inaccessibly in the domain of the unknown. 125 The problems that confront a person challenging extradition can be gleaned from considering the Department's grounds of appeal in Adamas (FFC). In elaborating on its grounds the Minister submitted that, in the first place, in the absence of direct evidence of the Minister's reasons for not disallowing extradition no inference could be drawn that the Minister had adopted the contents of that the Departmental document as his own reasoning, especially given that the This dilemma is not so much a case of: What is not known cannot be explained; rather of: What is not explained cannot be known. 129 Without a secure basis in published reasons an applicant and a reviewing court is left to face the Kafkaesque problem that "The right understanding of any matter and misunderstanding the same matter do not wholly exclude each other." 130 Necessarily, this intractability of access to the Minister's basis for decision opens the way for the executive to shield a significant field of the administrative decisions from effective review and does nothing to enhance transparency and the accountability of government.
The question can then be posed: as an element of the Rule of Law, is the lack of an obligation upon the Minister to explain and justify his or her decision in an intelligible way consistent with the requirements of Chapter III of the Constitution? The question is framed in terms of explanation and justification to avoid it being too readily and simplistically identified with the cognate but distinct question about whether there is a common law duty to provide reasons for administrative decision. 131
Arguments for implying a principle of justification
In the first place, it is necessary to appreciate that neither the Act nor any other Act such as the Gummow and Heydon JJ) . The problem with relying on compliance with the rules of natural justice is that in the event of non-compliance the court at best might grant mandamus to require consideration without testing whether the Minister's decision was based on a correct understanding of law. It is an essential characteristic of the judicature established by Ch III that it declares and determines the limits of power conferred by statute upon decision-makers. The various legislative powers for which the Constitution provides are expressed as being "subject to" the Constitution and thus to the operation of Ch III, in particular to the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by s 75. The reasoning supporting decisions made in particular controversies acquires a permanent, larger and general dimension as an aspect of the rule of law under the Constitution.
Section 75(v) is central to the maintenance of the rule of law under the Constitution. It ensures that those who exercise public powers are bound by the law authorising their actions. 139 The importance role of s 75(v) in maintaining governmental accountability and preventing the executive going outside the bounds of its lawful powers was emphasised by Flick J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB. 140 Regarding the significance of the s 75(v) in the scheme of review he said: 141 It is one thing for the Commonwealth legislature to pass a law to restrict or even exclude -or attempt to restrict or exclude -the scope of judicial review of administrative decision-making. So long as any such restriction or exclusion of judicial review is consistent with the Commonwealth Constitution -and, in particular, s 75(v) -such laws are within the legislative competence of the Commonwealth Parliament. It is thereafter the duty of the courts to apply the law to the matters that come before it.
It is an entirely a different thing for a Minister of the Crown to attempt to administer legislative powers entrusted to him in a manner which further attempts to exclude from judicial scrutiny the decisions he has made. (Emphasis added)
In order to determine both the limits on power and the facts which bring the decision within power the High Court must be able to ascertain the basis of the Commonwealth executive decisions. Otherwise the stream is free to rise above its source. 142 To be deprived of access to the Minister's reasons arguably renders judicial review ineffective 143 and would leave many questions of validity incontestable if the exercise of Commonwealth executive or statutory power is unexaminable. 144 At the least a refusal to give reasons, if not constitutionally mandated, should attract a heightened intensity of review.
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The argument for a constitutional obligation of justification is rooted not only in the rule of law as encapsulated in s 75(v) of the Constitution but also the principle of responsible government which forms part of the basic fabric of Chapters I and II of the Constitution. 145 Not only does non-disclosure of a Minister's reasons thwart the exercise of judicial review, it prevents the Parliament from adequately scrutinising decisions of the executive arm of government. 146 This is irrespective of whether the Minister's failure to explain her or his decision is a result of a deliberate refusal or simply the product of an executive default. 147 In both cases noncompliance constitutes an arbitrary defeasance of the constitutional scheme to ensure accountability of the executive.
The effect of failing or declining to furnish reasons can be approached by way of analogy. The inability of applicants for review to access the jurisdiction of the Federal Court due to executive default was raised in a series of refugee cases concerned with non-compliance with the time limit specified in s 478 of the Migration Act 1958. 148 Under that provision an applicant who sought review of a Refugee Review Tribunal decision had to lodge the application with the Federal Court within 28 days of being notified of the decision. The section then provided that the Federal Court must not make any order allowing an applicant to lodge an application outside the 28 day period. Asylum-seeking applicants in detention centres such as Port Hedland, even if they completed their applications a couple of days before the period expired were totally reliant on departmental officers to fax applications to the Federal Court in time. Not infrequently their applications were not received by the Court Registry until a day or two after the relevant date, preventing the lodging of the application within the specified time limit. No suggestion was made that this was deliberate. It appears to have occurred largely because of systemic factors such as when the outward mail-box was cleared.
The direction to the Federal Court not to extend time words was challenged as derogating from the essential character of the Federal Court as a Chapter III court and was incompatible with the standards of fairness appropriate for such a court. In effect, it would allow the executive government, by inaction, to dispense with an applicant's right to have a decision of the Tribunal reviewed. The Full Federal Court rejected these submissions on several occasions holding s 478 constitutionally valid. It held that s 478 defined the jurisdiction of the Federal Court and did not constitute an impermissible direction to the Court.
In one of these cases, WAFE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs application was made for special leave to appeal to the High Court. 149 Special leave was granted but before the High Court considered the constitutional objection to officers having a capacity to frustrate access to the Court's jurisdiction the Commonwealth granted asylum to the appellants. Of course in the case of Parliament the Minister or officials may be subject to questioning; query how effective that might be in a case involving a complex extradition matter.
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The term 'default' is used in a neutral sense without any necessary implication of culpability on the part of the Attorney or the relevant Departments. It could cover accidental failure to complete lodgement as well as negligent or deliberate conduct. The appeal accordingly lapsed so that the constitutional issue was left undetermined. It might be drawing a long bow to argue that the kind of executive default entailed in preventing asylumseekers in cases like WAFE having their matters reviewed is analogous with Ministers maintaining silence about their extradition decisions but the inhibitive effect of inaction or silence is similar in each case. 150 Both represent instances of substantially interference with or limiting access to the constitutional remedies provided under s 75(v).
Significantly, in Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 151 the High Court subsequently held that a provision in the Migration Act which purported to impose a 35 day limit on seeking a constitutional writ against an officer of the Commonwealth under section 75(v) of the Constitution was invalid. In the Court's view the time limit subverted the constitutional purpose of the remedy provided by s 75(v) particularly where the failure to comply is not due to any fault on the part of the applicant. Bodruddaza was concerned with the constitutional jurisdiction under s 75(v) whereas WAFE was dealing with a statutory jurisdiction that could be abolished at any time. In the end, if a constitutional requirement to provide reasons were confined to s 75(v) matters and not those arising under s 39B of the Judiciary Act it might prompt applicants to challenge extradition decisions directly in the High Court.
In Minister for Home Affairs of the Commonwealth v Zentai 152 the respondent raised by way of a ground of contention whether there was a constitutional requirement for the Minister, as an "officer of the Commonwealth" to provide some explanation regarding the basis for his decision. In the event, the High Court apart from Heydon J did not find it necessary to address the issue and it remains currently undetermined at that level. 153 Heydon J dissented on the major ground of appeal concerning the existence of the offence of war-crime. He therefore had to address the 'reasons' contention. He held that it is not possible to derive from s 75(v) an implication that all decision-making powers subject to s 75(v) review carried with them a duty to provide reasons. In rejecting the respondent's submissions, he made the observation that extradition decisions were not necessarily unexaminable for failure to provide reasons. This was because the decision-maker could, in his opinion, be compelled by subpoena to produce documents revealing the reasons for a given decision, or to reveal those reasons in response to interrogatories or under examination in the witness box. 154 In future extradition challenges, therefore, we may well see Commonwealth Ministers floundering under cross-examination for days on end attempting to explain why they decided not to refuse extradition. 155 Doubtless his Honour's observations have been viewed chillingly in the Canberra corridors of power.
Conclusion
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It could be argued, on the contrary, that non-compliance with s 478 prevented review absolutely whereas a failure to give reasons in extradition cases, though somewhat crippling, is not so extreme. Note 17 above. 153 The issue had been raised and decided against the respondent in the earlier rounds of the Zentai litigation. The thesis that has been propounded is that incorporation of the 'unjust exception' into extradition treaties opens the way for courts to measure whether extradition would be unjust, oppressive or incompatible with humanitarian considerations by reference to a fair trial requirements in Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR. In fact, as the recent case of Adamas illustrates a reviewing court can access the jurisprudence of international courts to inform its judgment about whether the Minister correctly understood when surrender would be unjust. This is irrespective of whether directly or indirectly the ICCPR has become part of Australian statutory law.
What the second part of this article makes clear, however, is that if it is not possible because of the structure of the Act, lack of evidence, procedural difficulties of having materials produced to the court, and especially the fact that the Minister is not required to justify a decision, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the basis of the Minister's decision regarding the fairness of an overseas trial, and hence subject the decision to judicial review. Only in an exceptional case, therefore, such as Adamas will it be possible to draw an inference from the failure of the Departmental submission to address an important point of interpretation and application of the 'unjust exception' to establish jurisdictional error. 156 In the end the problem may not be whether international human rights standards governing a fair trial are incorporated into the Act. It is whether they are capable of realisation in judicial proceedings as protections against executive incursion.
